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THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AT
75: IN NEED OF A HEART TRANSPLANT
CharlesB. Craver*

I.

INTRODUCTION

When the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")' was enacted in
1935, 13.2% of nonagricultural labor force participants were members of
labor organizations. 2 Most of these individuals were skilled craft
persons who were members of craft unions affiliated with the American
Federation of Labor ("AFL").3 Congress stated in section 1 of the
NLRA that "[t]he denial by some employers of the right of employees to
organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of
collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife
Congress also noted "[t]he inequality of bargaining
or unrest ...
power between employees who do not possess full freedom of
association... and employers who are organized in the corporate [form]
....
When the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the
NLRA, it recognized that:
[A] single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he
was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of
himself and family; that if the employer refused to pay him the wages
that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ
Freda H. Alverson, Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. J.D., 1971,

University of Michigan; M. Indus. & Labor Rels., 1968, Cornell University School of Labor &
Industrial Relations; B.S., 1967, Cornell University.
1. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
151-169 (2006)).
2. See MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES
10 tbl.l (1987).
3. MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870-1920 32 (2003) ("The largest national labor organization at the turn

of the century, the American Federation of Labor, consisted almost exclusively of craft unions of
male, skilled workers.").
4.

29 U.S.C. § 151.

5.

Id.
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and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; [and] that union was essential
to give laborers
opportunity to deal on an equality with their
6
employer.
By 1935, the United States had been transformed from an agrarian
to an industrial economy, as large manufacturing firms had been
established to produce automobiles, steel, glass, clothing, electrical
equipment, and similar commodities. 7 The highly specialized craft
unions associated with the AFL were finding it difficult to organize
manufacturing employees who possessed various skill levels. At the
1934 and 1935 AFL conventions, William Green and John L. Lewis
sought to create AFL industrial unions, but these efforts were defeated.8
Following the 1935 convention, leaders from the United Mine Workers,
the International Typographical Workers, the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers, the International Ladies' Garment Workers, the United Textile
Workers, the Oil Field, Gas Well, and Refinery Workers, the United
Hatters, Cap, and Millinery Workers, and the Mine, Mill, and Smelter
Workers met in Washington, D.C. to create the Committee for Industrial
Organization. 9
The Committee for Industrial Organization established different
organizing committees pertaining to industries including the steel,
textile, automobile, rubber, chemical, shipping, and electronics
industries. 10 AFL President Green expressed his dissatisfaction with
these splinter AFL entities, and trade union officials severely criticized
the Committee for Industrial Organization for its "dual union" efforts at
the 1937 AFL convention."
In 1938, the labor organizations
participating in the Committee for Industrial Organization withdrew
from the AFL and formed the Congress of Industrial Organizations
("CIO"). 2 During the following two decades, AFL craft unions and
6. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1936) (quoting Am. Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921)).
7. See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Beginnings of "Big Business" in the American Industry,
33 Bus. HIST. REV. 1, 4 (1959); see also Deborah A. Ballam, The Evolution of the GovernmentBusiness Relationship in the United States: Colonial Times to Present, 31 AM. Bus. L.J. 553, 598-

99(1994).
8.

See generally PHILIP TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 469 (1964) (For

example, "[iun the automobile industry, the pleas for an industrial union charter made by President
William Green and John L. Lewis were overruled, and the union was denied the right to include in
its ranks workers engaged in making tools and dies and those employed in and around automobile
plaints engaged in maintaining tools and buildings.").
9. See id. at 471-72.
10. See id. at 510-28; WALTER GALENSON, THE CIO CHALLENGE TO THE AFL: A HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 253 (1960).

11.
12.

See generally TAFT, supra note 8, at 472-75.
See id. at 528-29; see also Christopher L. Tomlins, AFL Unions in the 1930s: Their
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CIO industrial unions competed with each other to organize workers
employed in the emerging mass production industries. 13 By the mid1950s, 34.7%4 of American workers were members of labor
organizations.'
Corporate leaders were becoming increasingly concerned about the
diminishing profits caused by higher labor costs associated with labor
organizations and the collective bargaining process. 15 They sought new16
legislation that would curtail the rights of unions and their members.
In 1947, corporate leaders induced Congress to enact the Labor
Management Relations Act ("LMRA") 17 amendments to the NLRA.
These amendments created a section proscribing unfair labor practices
by labor organizations which expressly limited secondary activity by
unions engaged in bargaining disputes.' 8 They also outlawed the closed
shop, which had allowed unions to negotiate agreements requiring
employers to hire only persons who were already union members.' 9
Business groups induced Congress to further narrow worker and
union rights in the 1959 Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act ("LMRDA") 2 ° amendments to the NLRA. These legislative changes
expanded the scope of prohibited secondary activities and outlawed
many forms of organizational and recognitional picketing. 21 Other
LMRDA provisions regulated internal union affairs, imposed fiduciary
obligations on labor organizations, and required unions to file annual
financial reports with the Secretary of Labor.22
Despite the organizing achievements of CIO industrial unions and
the continued vitality of AFL craft unions, labor officials did not like the
Performance in HistoricalPerspective, 65 J. AM. HIST. 1021, 1021 (1979).
13. See Tomlins, supra note 12, at 1021-22.
14. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 2, at 10 tbl.I.
15. See Craig A. Olson & Brian E. Becker, The Effects of the NLRA on Stockholder Wealth in
the 1930s, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 116, 123 (1990) (discussing that the profits of a sample of
seventy-five firms declined sixteen percent during the fourteen months in which the NLRA was
being considered by Congress).
16. See TAFT, supra note 8, at 587 (providing that "employers sought to have some of the
provisions governing the secondary boycott, industrywide bargaining, and other clauses made more
stringent").
17. Pub. L. No. 80-101,61 Stat. 136 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.) (2006).
18. See id.
19. Id.; see also THEODORE J. ST. ANTOINE, CHARLES B. CRAVER & MARION G. CRAIN,
LABOR RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 112 (11th ed. 2005). New employees could not

be required to become union members until after thirty days of employment. See 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(3) (2006).
20. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519-46 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531)
(2006).
21.
22.

See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), (b)(7).
See id. § 431.
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open competition between AFL and CIO entities. By late 1955, the
merger of AFL and CIO unions was achieved.2 3 Although the reunited
AFL-CIO decided not to form a separate labor party, the labor
movement exerted substantial political influence.2 4 Political action
committees contributed significant financial support to individuals
supportive of worker rights,2 5 and AFL-CIO affiliates lobbied in favor of
legislation designed to advance employee rights.26 Some of the
beneficial enactments that enjoyed labor support include: the Equal Pay
Act of 1963,27 prohibiting compensation differentials between men and
women performing equal work; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,28 proscribing employment discrimination based upon race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967,29 outlawing employment discrimination against individuals
forty and older; the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,30
protecting the employment environments of workers; the Employment
Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974, 3' protecting the economic
soundness of employee pension and welfare benefits; and the Americans
with Disabilities Act,32 enhancing the employment rights of persons with
significant disabilities. Labor organizations also lobbied for greater
employee rights under worker and unemployment compensation statutes,
and many other laws furthering worker interests.33
Employer opposition to labor organizations expanded greatly
during the inflationary years of the 1970s, as cost-of-living adjustment
clauses in bargaining agreements required firms to increase wages to
match increases in the consumer price index. 34 Companies began to
23. See TAFT, supra note 8, at 660.
24. See generally id. at 609-17 (discussing the creation of the Political Action Committee by
the CIO and its "campaign for mobilizing the members of the CIO and other organized workers and
their families 'for effective action on the political front').
25. See id. at 609 ("The CIO unions contributed $631,214.11. Up to July 23, PAC received
$671,214.11, spent $371,086.56, and froze the remainder until November 7. The voluntary
contributions financed PAC's election activities.").
26. See id. at 606-07.
27. Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 102, 77 Stat. 56-57 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206) (2006).
28. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-703, 78 Stat. 241, 253-58 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
2000a-h-6) (2006).
29. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34) (2006).
30. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78) (2006).
31. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-461) (2006).
32. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213)
(2006).
33. See generally Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers'
Compensation in the United States, 1900-1930, 41 J.L. & ECON. 305, 310 (1998) (discussing bow
organized labor lobbied on behalf of workers' compensation during the early 1900s).
34. See generally Ronald G. Ehrenberg et al., Cost-of-Living Adjustment Clauses in Union
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look for ways to reduce labor costs. Some transferred production to
lower wage areas within the United States, some relocated operations to
lower wage countries like Mexico and China, and others demanded
concession bargaining that forced labor organizations to accept reduced
wages and benefits.35
Unionized workers were not only being challenged by these
developments, but also by significant demographic, technological,
industrial, and international changes. Although union membership
increased from 17,000,000 to 22,000,000 from the mid-1950s through
1980, the percentage of nonagricultural labor force participants in unions
declined from roughly thirty-five to twenty-three percent due to the fact
that labor organization growth did not keep pace with overall labor force
growth.3 6 Since 1980, the strength of unions has declined both in
absolute terms and as a percentage of the nonagricultural labor force.
By 1990, there were only 16,740,000 union members in the United
States, comprising 16.1% of labor force participants. 37 By the end of
2009, there were 15,327,000 union members, constituting a mere 12.3%
of labor force participants.3 8 This figure masks the actual decline in
private sector membership, because it includes the 37.4% of government
employees who are union members. When only private sector workers
are considered, the number of union members declines to 7,431,000
representing 7.2% of employed persons.3 9
Over the past several decades, the American economy has changed
significantly. It has been transformed not only from an industrial to a
white-collar, service, and retail economy, but also from long-term, stable
employment relationships to short-term arrangements n° Businesses do
not hesitate to lay off large numbers of workers when necessary, and
many firms use independent contractors and "permatemps" retained

Contracts: A Summary of Results, I J. LAB. ECON. 215, 216-26 (1983) (citations omitted) (noting

that cost-of-living clauses included in union contracts during the 1970s led to increases in the wages
of those employees covered by the clauses, and also that these clauses prevent the employer from
altering relative wages during the period covered by the clause, which reduces his "willingness to
agree to COLA provisions").
35. See generally ROBERT H. ZIEGER, AMERICAN WORKERS, AMERICAN UNIONS, 1920-1985
194 (1986) (discussing that by the late 1970s, "unions submitted to 'concession bargaining,' trading
wage increases, work-rule changes, and fringe benefits for jobs").
36. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 2, at 10- 1l tbls.l & 2.
37. See Union Membership Stays on Downward Trend, Falling to 16.1 Percent of
Employment, 26 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) B-8 (Feb. 7, 1991).
38. Unions Lost 771,000 Members in 2009, as Recession Eliminated Jobs, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) AA-I (Jan. 25, 2010).
39. See id. at E-3 tbl.3.
40. See generally KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 67-86 (2004).
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Millions of manufacturing and

service jobs have been outsourced to low wage workers in countries like
China, Malaysia, and India.4 2

As union density has declined, employee job security and economic
circumstances have suffered.43 Few twenty-first century workers expect
to be employed by the same firms throughout their adult lives. Over the
past forty years, CEO compensation has risen dramatically, 44 and the
Dow Jones average has gone from under $1000 to over $10,000, despite
the 2008-2009 economic crisis. 45 During this same period, the real
wages and benefits of regular workers has been stagnant. Without a
collective voice provided by union representation, employees have not
been able to share in the economic growth United States businesses have
46
seen over the past twenty years.
A study conducted by Professors Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers

about ten years ago found that eighty-seven percent of workers would
like some form of collective voice to influence firm decisions that affect
their job security and employment conditions-almost half would like
traditional union representation, but fear employer reprisals if they
openly support

unionization.4 7

Employers

appreciate

the

modest

remedies available under the NLRA for unfair labor practice violations.
If they discriminatorily terminate union supporters, they are merely

41. See Orly Lobel, The Slipperiness of Stability: Contractingfor Flexible and Triangular
Employment Relationships in the New Economy, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 109, 113-15 (2003).
42. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD Is FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 208-09 (2005); ROBYN MEREDITH, THE ELEPHANT AND THE DRAGON:
THE RISE OF INDIA AND CHINA, AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR ALL OF US 83 (2007) ("Thousands of
companies have latched on to the trend, moving service sector jobs not just to India but also to
Eastern Europe, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, and other developing countries .... ").
43. See generally STEVEN GREENHOUSE, THE BIG SQUEEZE: TOUGH TIMES FOR THE
AMERICAN WORKER 13 (2008) (discussing how American workers have been hurt by numerous
factors, including the decrease in union activity).
44. In 2005, the median compensation of the CEOs at 350 large publicly traded corporations
was $6.8 million. See Mercer Survey Finds Median CEO Earned$6.8 Million in Total Pay in 2005,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-9 (Apr. It, 2006). CEOs who used to cam about 40 times what bluecollar workers earned in 1960 now earn almost 500 times what typical employees earn. See Jennifer
Reingold, Executive Pay, BUS. WK., Apr. 17, 2000, at 110.
45. See Dow Jones Industrial Average, http://stockcharts.com/charts/historicalldjial900.html
(last visited Mar. 2, 2010).
46. See generally CENTURY FOUNDATION, THE NEW AMERICAN ECONOMY: A RISING TIDE
THAT LIFTS ONLY YACHTS I (Matt Homer et al. eds., 2008), available at
http://www.tcf.org/Publications/ Economicslnequality/wasow-yachtrc.pdf. "For those at the top of
the income ladder, the 1980s and especially the 1990s were a period of rapid income and wealth
growth. But for those in the middle class and for the poor, it was a period of stagnation, marked by
very modest income gains." Id.
47. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 147 exhibit 7.2
(1999).
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obliged to provide those persons with back pay and reinstatement, and
such remedies are frequently not effectuated until several years after the
original violations. 48 Threats of adverse consequences if workers select
exclusive bargaining agents do not result in any monetary remedies.49
The offending employers are simply directed not to engage in similar
behavior in the future.5 °
The NLRA has failed to keep up with economic developments over
the past fifty years. 5 1 The statute was designed primarily for expansive
manufacturing companies that would have to accept the inevitability of
unionization.52 The statute does not work well with respect to service
and retail firms that are strongly opposed to unionization and will do
almost anything to defeat organization campaigns. The labor movement
has also failed to adapt to twenty-first century workers. Many continue
to employ blue-collar organizing campaigns to appeal to new age whitecollar and service personnel who think that conventional unions consist
of "working class" and unprofessional members.
This article will consider changes that should be made in the NLRA
if it is to be a meaningful factor in the corning years. How should the
statute regulate the employment relationships of twenty-first century
workers? What unfair labor practice remedies should be provided to
deter and rectify improper conduct? How should the union certification
procedures be changed to make it easier for workers who truly desire
union representation to select bargaining agents? What should be done
when newly certified labor organizations find it difficult to obtain initial
bargaining agreements?
We will also contemplate ways in which union leaders must adapt
to changing circumstances. The recent formation of the Change-to-Win
Coalition is a step in the right direction, as leaders from unions like the
Service Employees, the United Food and Commercial Workers, the
Teamsters, the Laborers, and UNITE-HERE endeavor to develop new
organizing tactics that may appeal to contemporary employees. We will

48. Richard Trotter, The Proposed Employee Free Choice Act: Strengthening the American
Middle Class or Tyranny by Union Organizations?,J. Bus. & ECON. REs. 53, 56 (2008); see also
Charles B. Craver, The Relevance of the NLRA and Labor Organizations in the Post-Industrial,
Global Economy, 57 LAB. L.J. 133, 134-35 (2006).
49. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006).
50. See id.
51. See generally Cynthia Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLuM. L.
REV. 1527 (2002).
52. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 151 (stating that it is the "policy of the United States to
eliminates the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation
of representatives of their own choosing .... ").
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finally explore ways in which individuals who would like a collective
voice, but not through conventional union representation, could be
provided with meaningful participation rights.
II. HOW TO MAKE THE NLRA RELEVANT IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY
Since the adoption of the NLRA, significant issues have arisen in
three major areas. First, the scope of statutory coverage-what workers
are entitled to NLRA protection. Second, the manner in which labor
organizations can establish majority support and the right to act as
employee bargaining representatives. Third, what should be done when
selected unions are unable to achieve initial bargaining agreements?
A. Scope of Statutory Coverage
Following the enactment of the NLRA, the Labor Board and the
courts provided workers with expansive statutory coverage. Lower level
supervisors were allowed to be included in bargaining units, 53 and the
"economic realities test" was established by the Supreme Court to
extend coverage to newspaper sellers who would have constituted
"independent contractors" under traditional legal doctrines.5 4
Unless the common-law tests are to be imported and made exclusively
controlling, without regard to the statute's purposes, it cannot be
irrelevant that the particular workers in these cases are subject, as a
matter of economic fact, to the evils the statute was designed to
eradicate ....

Interruption of commerce through strikes and unrest

may stem as well from labor disputes between some who, for other
purposes, are technically "independent contactors" and their employers
as from disputes between persons who, for those purposes, are
"employees" and their employers. Inequality of bargaining power in
controversies over wages, hours and working conditions may as well
characterize the status of the one group as of the other. The former,
when acting alone, may be as "helpless in dealing with an employer,"

53. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 490 (1947).
Though the foreman is the faithful representative of the employer in maintaining a
production schedule, his interest properly may be adverse to that of the employer when it
comes to fixing his own wages, hours, seniority rights or working conditions. He does
not lose his right to serve himself in these respects because he serves his master in
others.
Id. at 489-90.
54. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 128 (1943).
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as "dependent . . . on his daily wage" and as "unable to leave
55 the
employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment" as the latter.
Employers were displeased with these expansive Supreme Court
decisions, and in 1947, they induced Congress to amend the NLRA
definition of "employee" to expressly exclude both "supervisors" and
"independent contractors. 5 6 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have
expansively applied these statutory exclusions. Professional persons,
like licensed practical nurses and registered nurses, who do not possess
the managerial authority traditionally associated with true supervisory
status but who in the ordinary course of their regular duties give
relatively rote directives to their assistants, have been found to constitute
excluded supervisory personneli 7 For example, in NLRB v. Health Care
& Retirement Corp.,58 the Court rejected a Labor Board finding that "a
nurse's direction of less-skilled employees, in the exercise of
professional judgment incidental to the treatment of patients" was
insufficient to render them supervisors.59
Such individuals would
constitute excluded supervisory personnel so long as they had to exercise
independent judgment of more than a routine nature when they directed
the work of less-skilled employees.
In NLRB v. Kentucky River
Community Care,Inc.,61 the Court rejected another Labor Board effort to
extend statutory coverage to registered nurses who used "ordinary
professional or technical judgment" to direct the work of aides, as it held
that such persons were still "supervisors" because of their exercise of
"independent judgment" when they directed the work of those aides.62
In the late 1970s, faculty members at Yeshiva University decided
they needed a collective voice to influence their employment conditions.
Although such academics do not constitute "supervisors," due to their
lack of control over subordinates, the Supreme Court held that they
could not unionize since they were "managerial" employees who
"formulate and effectuate management policies63 by expressing and
making operative the decisions of their employer.,

55. Id. at 127-28 (citations omitted).
56. Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 2(3), 61 Stat. 136, 137-38 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(3) (2006)).
57. See NLRB v. Heath Care & Ret. Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 584 (1993).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 574 (citations omitted).
60. See id. at 579.
61. 532 U.S. 706 (2000).
62. Seeid. at 713.
63. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 682 (1980) (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,
416 U.S. 267, 288 (1974)).
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[T]he faculty of Yeshiva University exercise authority which in any
other context unquestionably would be managerial. Their authority in
academic matters is absolute. They decide what courses will be
offered, when they will be scheduled, and to whom they will be taught.
They debate and determine teaching methods, grading policies, and
matriculation standards. They effectively decide which students will
be admitted, retained, and graduated. On occasion, their views have
determined the size of the student body, the tuition to be charged, and
the location of a school. When one considers the function of a
university,
it is difficult to imagine decisions more managerial than
64
these.
The nursing and university professor decisions have made it
difficult for professional individuals to obtain NLRA coverage, even
where they do not possess the authority generally associated with true
supervisory or managerial status. True supervisors have the power to
hire, meaningfully direct, and discipline the work of subordinates.6 5
They do not merely give occasional professional directions to their
assistants.66 Section 2(11) of the NLRA,6 7 should be amended to make it
clear that the only persons excluded as "supervisors" include individuals
who not only have the authority to meaningfully direct the work of
others but also possess the power to discipline such coworkers if they
fail to carry out their directives. Professionals who have the authority to
hire, meaningfully direct, and discipline subordinates should certainly
continue to be excluded. Nonetheless, professionals such as registered
and licensed practical nurses who merely direct the basic work of aides
without the power to hire or discipline such individuals should be
considered "employees" who have the right to organize and to engage in
collective bargaining under the statute.
Congress should similarly amend section 2(3)68 to limit the scope of
the common law "managerial" exclusion. Only those individuals who
meaningfully participate in the determination of important management
policies affecting employment conditions should be excluded. Persons
like professors who can affect academic policies but who have no
meaningful influence over their own wages, hours, and working
64. Id. at 686.
65. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2006) (defining the term
"supervisor").
66. Cf NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 710 ("[The Sixth Circuit] rejected
the Board's interpretation of 'independent judgment,' explaining that the Board had erred by
classifying 'the practice of a nurse supervising a nurse's aide in administering patient care' as
'routine'...." (quoting Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. v. NLRB, 193 F.3d 444, 453 (1999))).
67.

29 U.S.C. § 152(11).

68.

Id. § 152(3).
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conditions should not be denied the right to select bargaining
representatives.
As we have entered the twenty-first century, employment
relationships have changed significantly. The American economy has
been transformed not only from an industrial to a white-collar and
service economy, but also from long-term, stable employment
relationships to shorter-term employment arrangements. 69 Truck drivers
who used to be employed by freight companies to drive trucks have been
replaced by independent owner-operators who lease their vehicles to
freight firms and are technically "independent contractors" excluded
from NLRA coverage. 70 Other employers have similarly replaced
conventional employees with independent contractors who perform the
same basic tasks under similar working conditions.7' Many companies
bring in workers from employment agencies, like Man-Power
Incorporated, to perform services on a long term basis.72
Such
"permatemps" are generally regarded as employees of the lending firms
and not of the borrowing firms who really use their continued services.73
Congress should amend the NLRA definition of "employee" to
include the "economic realities" test articulated by the Supreme Court in
the Hearst Publications decision.74
Workers who are not truly
independent contractors running their own separate businesses should be
provided with statutory protection when they work primarily or
exclusively for single employers and perform basic services for those
firms under circumstances analogous to traditional master-servant
relationships. Such a statutory modification would enable cab drivers,
truck drivers, free-lance workers, and other persons who really function
as "employees" of the corporations that retain their services to exercise
the rights provided in the NLRA.
The Labor Board held in 2000 that an appropriate bargaining unit
could include both regular employees and employees borrowed from
69. See generally STONE, supranote 40, at 67-86.
70. See N. Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 869 F.2d 596, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
71. See STONE, supra note 40, at 215 (explaining that independent contractors are included in
the category of part-time and temporary workers).
72. See id. at 67 ("In 1993, FORTUNE magazine reported that Manpower, Inc. had become the
largest employer in America.").
73. See id. at 68.
In a temporary employment setting, the agency pays the employee directly and the
agency, not the user firm, is considered the employer for purposes of labor and
employment laws. That is, even though the individual employee works on the user firm's
worksite and utilizes the user firm's tools, the temporary agency is, legally speaking, the
employer.
Id.
74. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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temporary agencies on an on-going basis. 75 The user firm would be
solely responsible for bargaining with the certified union with respect
the wages and working conditions of regular employees and the user
firm and the supplier agency would be jointly responsible for bargaining
with respect to the "jointly employed" workers.76 In 2004, however, the
Labor Board overruled M.B. Sturgis and held that such mixed bargaining
units would only be permitted when both the staffing agency and the
user firm consent to the inclusion of regular and temporary employees in
the same unit. 77 The Board should consider a return to M.B. Sturgis, and
hold that where firms retain borrowed employees from temporary
agencies on a regular basis for more than a minimal term-e.g., one or
two years-a bargaining unit of the user firm could include both groups
of employees. The user firm would be solely responsible for bargaining
with respect to regular employees and jointly responsible with the
lending agency for the terms of employment with respect to the
borrowed employees.
As we have moved further into the twenty-first century, American
firms have been employing an increasing number of undocumented
aliens.7 8 Businesses may hire such individuals without knowledge of
their unlawful status, but many either rely upon questionable forged
documents or do not ask for appropriate documentation.7 9 Many of
these employers do not provide such persons with the $7.25 minimum
wage, and they often fail to provide them with overtime pay for hours
worked in excess of forty in a week. 80 They know that such individuals
would not dare to complain to Wage and Hour offices, due to their fear
of deportation if their undocumented status is discovered.8 Employers
are also comfortable knowing that they can terminate such workers if
they have the temerity to support union organizing drives. 82

75.
76.

See M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1298, 1308-09 (2000).
See id. at 1306.

77.

See Oakwood Care Ctr., 343 N.L.R.B. 659, 663 (2004).

78. See James A.R. Nafziger, Immigration and Immigration Law After 9/11: Getting It
Straight, 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 555, 563 (2009).
79. See Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National Identification
Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319, 355 (2002).

80. See id. (stating that "employers prefer to risk fines in order to pay a captive workforce less
than they pay others, often far below minimum wage"). Hiring undocumented workers means that
"[e]mployers can make large profits because illegal aliens are easily exploited ..... Id.
81. See, e.g., Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism,Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the
Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1453 (2006) ("Unscrupulous employers often cheat unauthorized
aliens out of their wages, relying on the fear of deportation to keep many unauthorized aliens from
reporting the abuse.").
82. See generally Thomas J. Walsh, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: How the
Supreme CourtEroded Labor Law and Workers Rights in the Name of Immigration Policy, 21 LAW
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Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB 83 concerned an employer that reported
undocumented aliens to the Immigration and Naturalization Service in
retaliation for their union activities.84 Although these individuals
voluntarily agreed to leave the United States, the Supreme Court agreed
with the Labor Board that such undocumented aliens constitute
"employees" within the meaning of the NLRA, thus rendering the
employer's retaliatory action an unfair labor practice under section
8(a)(3).85 As a result of the unusual nature of undocumented aliens, the
Supreme Court made the Board's reinstatement and backpay remedial
order conditional on the discriminatees lawful reentry into the United
States.86 This limitation was based upon the fact that employees must be
considered unavailable for work and not entitled to backpay during any
period when they are not lawfully entitled to be present and employed
within the United States.87 In Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB, 88 a five-Justice Supreme Court majority expanded the remedial
limitation it had imposed in Sure-Tan, as the Court held that the
enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA") 89 in
1986, made it even clearer that the Labor Board may not order the
reinstatement of, or award backpay to, undocumented workers illegally
terminated by employers because of their otherwise protected
activities---even if those remedies are conditioned upon the lawful
reentry of the discriminatees into the United States. 90 "[A]llowing the
Board to award backpay to illegal aliens would unduly trench upon
explicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as
expressed in IRCA. It would encourage the successful evasion of
apprehension by immigration authorities, condone prior violations of the
immigration laws, and encourage future violations." 91 The four
dissenting Justices asserted that the denial of any backpay to

& INEQ. 313, 313 (2003) (describing that employers may threaten their illegal immigrant workers
with termination or deportation to prevent unionization).
83. 467 U.S. 883 (1983).
84. See id. at 886-87.
85. See id. at 892; see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006) (prohibiting employer discrimination
to encourage or discourage support for labor organizations).
86. See Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 903.
87. Id.
88. 535 U.S. 137 (2001).
89. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.)
(2006).
90. See Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 143, 149-50 ("Though we found that the employer had
committed serious violations of the NLRA, the Board had no discretion to remedy those violations
by awarding reinstatement with backpay to employees who themselves had committed serious
criminal acts.").
91. Id. at 151.
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undocumented workers-especially those who had been knowingly or
indifferently hired by employers-would reduce the cost to firms that
illegally discharge employees for supporting labor organizations. 92
What the majority failed to appreciate in Hoffman Plastic was the
fact that it should have balanced the unlawful conduct by the
employer-both in originally hiring the undocumented workers and in
terminating their services and reporting them to the INS as a result of
their protected activities in support of a labor organization-against the
unlawful entry of those individuals into the United States. As the
dissenting Justices acknowledged, when employers hire such persons
either knowing of their illegal status or indifferent to that fact, those
firms are violating the IRCA with the intent to exploit the undocumented
workers.9 3 When such employers decide to discharge those individuals
because of their protected activities, the employers should not be
permitted to escape remedial responsibility. On the other hand, it would
clearly be inappropriate to grant such persons regular reinstatement due
to the fact that they are not lawfully present in the United States.
Either Congress should consider an amendment to the IRCA or the
Supreme Court should contemplate a reassessment of its Hoffman
Plastic decision to formulate an approach that would impose an
appropriate cost to employers who violate the NLRA by illegally
terminating employees while recognizing the unlawful status of
undocumented workers. They could do this by allowing them to vote in
any scheduled Labor Board election and be counted as part of the
proposed bargaining unit, and granting them full backpay from the date
of their illegal discharge until the case has been finally resolved and the
employer has fully complied with other aspects of the Labor Board's
remedial order. Although this approach would admittedly provide such
persons with backpay covering time they could not lawfully have
remained in the country, it is the only way to impose a meaningful
remedy upon the party directly responsible for their current
unemployment. The Labor Board should also be empowered to direct
the reinstatement of such persons in the future, once they can
demonstrate that they have lawfully reentered the United States.
B. Meansfor Unions to Establish Majority Support
When the NLRA was originally enacted, a number of labor

92. See id. at 154 (citing A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc. 320 N.L.R.B. 408, 415 n.38
(1995)).
93. See id. at 154-55.
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organizations represented workers on a "members-only" basis.94 They
negotiated agreements that only applied to individuals who were actual
union members.9 5 Congress implicitly acknowledged these relationships
in section 7,96 which granted employees the right "to bargain collectively
97
through representatives of their own choosing," and section 8(a)(5),
which made it an unfair labor practice for employers "to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of [their] employees,
subject to the provisions of section 9(a)." Section 9(a) 98 made it clear
that "[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of
all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining.
. . .,,99 When sections 7, 8(a)(5), and 9(a) are read together and in a
manner consistent with the bargaining practices existing in 1935, it
becomes clear that Congress intended to allow unions to continue to
demand and receive bargaining rights on a members-only basis--except
where a majority of employees had selected an exclusive bargaining
agent that would bargain on behalf of all of the employees in the
designated unit.1 00
In the original NLRA, Congress indicated that the Labor Board
could certify an exclusive bargaining representative by way of "a secret
ballot of employees, or . . .any other suitable method to ascertain"
has the support of a majority of
whether a particular labor union
° Such
Board certification could thus be
employees ina particular unit.10
based upon union membership cards, recognition strikes demanding
employer recognition of a specific union, or secret ballot elections. In
1947, however, business firms trying to make it more difficult for unions
to obtain Labor Board certification induced Congress to narrow the
language in section 9(c) to permit union certification only by way of
secret ballot elections. 0 2
Although Professors Freeman and Medoff found that eighty-seven

94. See CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS
IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 20-21 (2005).

95. See id.
96. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
97. Id. § 158(a)(5).
98. Id. § 159(a).
99. Id.
100. See MORRIS, supra note 94, at 20-21.
101. See THEODORE J. ST. ANTOINE, CHARLES B. CRAVER & MARION G. CRAIN, LABOR
RELATIONS LAW: SELECTED FEDERAL STATUTES AND SAMPLE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 14
(2005).
102. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c).
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percent of workers would like a collective voice today to influence their
employment conditions, recognizing that individuals possess no
meaningful bargaining power, most are hesitant to openly support union
organizing efforts out of fear they will be terminated. 10 3 The existing
system makes it difficult for unions to organize employees where their
As soon as
employers are completely opposed to unionization.
begin
to express
they
organizing
campaigns,
employers learn of incipient
their anti-union sentiments at "captive audience" speeches (which
employees must attend) through supervisory talks with individual
employees, postings on firm bulletin boards, e-mail communications,
messages in pay check envelopes, and other similar channels. 10 4 Prounion employees may only engage in campaigning during non-work
time, 10 5 and outside union organizers may almost never gain access to
target employees on company premises. 106
To provide union supporters with an equal opportunity to convey
their pro-labor sentiments to fellow workers, Congress should amend the
NLRA to require employers that express anti-union viewpoints to grant
equal communication channels to employees who favor organization. If
captive audience speeches are employed, pro-union workers should be
given an equal amount of time to address the audience. If anti-union
messages are posted on firm bulletin boards, sent through company email systems, or placed in employee pay envelopes, union supporters
should be allowed to express their views through the same mediums.
Although employers clearly enjoy a First Amendment right to express
their anti-union sentiments, 0 7 they should not be allowed a wholly

103. See supranote 48 and accompanying text.
104. See generally Heath Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 134 (1972) (holding that employer anti-union
speeches over a public address system is not an unfair labor practice and does not require an equal
opportunity for the union to reply); Gen. Elec. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1247 (1966) (holding that the
employer need not grant the union an equal opportunity to reply to captive audience speeches); Gen.
Shoe Corp., 97 N.L.R.B. 499 (1951) (discussing the practice of calling employees into the
employer's office individually and in small groups to urge employees to reject unionization).
105. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 796, 805 (1945).
106. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 534 (1991). "[N]onemployee organizers
cannot claim even a limited right of access to a nonconsenting employer's property," with a narrow
exception where "the location of a plant and the living quarters of the employees place the
employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with them." Id. at 534, 539
(quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956)). However, the "union's
burden of establishing such isolation is ... not satisfied by mere conjecture or the expression of
doubts concerning the effectiveness of nontrespassory means of communication." Id. at 540.
107. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006) (expressly protecting the free speech rights of employers
and labor organizations under the NLRA); see generally NLRB v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S.
469, 477 (1941) ("Neither the [NLRA] nor the Board's order here enjoins the employer from
expressing its view on labor policies or problems, nor is a penalty imposed upon it because of any
utterances which it has made.").
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unbalanced privilege. If democratic elections are to be conducted, both
sides should enjoy the same opportunities to convey their messages.
Employers wishing to avoid the need to provide pro-union workers with
such communication channels could easily do so by foregoing the use of
communication means they do not wish to make available to union
supporters. They could still convey their messages during non-work
time, just as employees are allowed to do so. They could also send
letters to employee homes, since pro-union workers could use this same
medium.
Even when unions are able to obtain authorization cards, indicating
a desire for union representation, from a majority of employees in
proposed units, employers may refuse to grant such organizations
bargaining rights and force them to petition the Labor Board for
representation elections.10 8 It can take fifty to sixty days from the time
unions petition for elections until they are conducted. 10 9 During this
time, employers can repeatedly communicate with employees to indicate
why they should not select bargaining agents.1"' Although employers
may not threaten or coerce employees, since such conduct would
contravene section 8(a)(l), 111 they have the express right to
communicate their views regarding unionization so long as their
statements do not contain threats of reprisal or promises of benefits. 1 2 If
they carefully formulate "predictions" that are based upon objective
facts and express their opinion with respect to probable consequences
arising from those facts, such communications are entirely
permissible.1 13 They may thus be able to indicate that if unions are
selected and generate increased labor costs, firms may be forced to close
existing facilities.' 14
Some firms do not simply exercise their statutory right to
communicate their anti-union perspective in a noncoercive manner.
They employ anti-union consultants who frequently employ

108. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 310 (1974).
109. See William B. Gould IV, The Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, Labor Law Reform,
and What Can Be Done About the Broken System of Labor-Management Relations Law in the
United States, 43 U.S.F. L. REv. 291, 315 (2008).
110. See Va. Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. at 477.

111.

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006).

112. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1968) ("[A]n employer is free to
communicate to his employees any of his general views about unionism or any of his specific views
about a particular union, so long as the communications do not contain a 'threat of reprisal or force
or promise of benefit."') (citation omitted).
113. See id.
114. See, e.g., Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. NLRB, 36 F.3d 1130, 1133-34 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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impermissible tactics.' 1 5 They overtly threaten proposed unit employees
with lost employment if unions are selected.' 6 They have their clients
discharge open union supporters, hoping to chill the pro-union activities
of other workers)' 7 If they can terminate such persons in a humiliating
fashion, they may be able to provoke an unprotected response that will
end the right of the unlawfully fired persons to further backpay or
reinstatement. 11 8 Although the Labor Board believes that unlawfully
terminated employees should refrain from unprotected actions and resort
to administrative and judicial channels that may take several years to
complete,1 9 this is both unfair and unrealistic. As soon as open union
supporters are fired, remaining employees are afraid to openly express
their support for union representation.
The inappropriate impact of unlawfully terminated union supporters
is exacerbated if the discharged individuals lose their right to backpay
and reinstatement because of unprotected responses. The appropriate
approach was recognized by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals:
[W]here an employer who has committed unfair labor practices
discharges employees for unprotected acts of misconduct, the Board
must consider both the seriousness of the employer's unlawful acts and
the seriousness of the employees' misconduct in determining whether
reinstatement would effectuate the policies of the Act. Those policies
inevitably come into conflict when both labor and management are at
fault. To hold that employee "misconduct" automatically precludes
compulsory reinstatement ignores two considerations which we think
important. First, the employer's antecedent unfair labor practices may
have been so blatant that they provoked employees to resort to
unprotected action. Second, reinstatement is the only sanction which
prevents an employer from benefiting from his unfair labor
120 practices
through discharges which may weaken or destroy a union.
Even when the Labor Board previously balanced the misconduct of
unfair labor practice strikers against the seriousness of prior employer
violations, the Board refused to reinstate individuals who were guilty of

115. See generally MARTIN JAY LEVITT & TERRY CONROW, CONFESSIONS OF A UNION
BUSTER 1 (1993) (comparing anti-union consultants to terrorists who make intense and
demonstrative personal attacks on their opponents).
116. See generally id.
117. See generally id.
118. See Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1047 (1984), enforced, 765 F.2d 148

(9th Cir. 1985).
119.
120.

Seeid.
Local 833, UAW v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 699, 702-03 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (citation omitted).
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21
violence or the immediate threat of violence.1
One way to ameliorate the negative impact of illegal terminations
would be to amend the remedial provisions of the NLRA to provide the
adversely affected individuals with expeditious reinstatement. At the
present time, it can take one or two years from the time employees are
unlawfully discharged until they are finally reinstated.1 22 By then, union
organizing campaigns are often defeated. Even if prior representation
elections won by employers are overturned and new elections are held,
the lingering negative impact of illegal threats and employee
to cause many employees to still vote against
terminations tends
23

representation.'

The remedial scheme under the NLRA is biased in favor of employers.
The primary reason for this statutory imbalance concerns the fact that
an extremely pro-business Congress added the most potent unfair labor
practice remedies to the NLRA in 1947. When the Labor-Management
Relations Act amendments were adopted, most of the new remedial
provisions pertained to violations committed by labor organizations,
not those perpetrated by employers. For example, the new Section
10(1) specified that charges involving secondary union activity under
Section 8(b)(4) or 8(e) or regarding organizational or recognitional
picketing under Section 8(b)(7) shall be handled on a priority basis.
Whenever an employer alleges a violation of one of these provisions,
the Labor Board must seek an immediate injunctive order against the
offending union behavior. This protects the employer's interest while
the subsequent unfair labor practice proceedings are conducted. If the
NLRB fails to seek a restraining order against such proscribed union
activity, the affected business firm may petition
124 a district court for a
write of mandate ordering the Board to do so.
If the Labor Board ultimately finds that the challenged union action
does violate these provisions, it must issue a cease and desist order
prohibiting any future conduct of a similar nature.125 In addition,
employers affected by secondary activity which contravenes section
8(b)(4) may sue the offending labor organization in district court to

121. See Kayser-Roth Hosiery Co., 187 N.L.R.B. 562, 578 (1970), modified, 447 F.2d 396 (6th
Cir. 1971); see also Oneita Knitting Mills v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 1967).
122. See NLRB v. J-H Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258 (1969).
123. See Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. NLRB, 104 F.3d 1354, 1355-56 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In this
case, election results were in employer's favor after employer vigorously attacks union organizing
efforts in pre-election campaign. Id.
124. Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve
IndustrialDemocracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REv. 397, 431 (1992) (citations omitted).
125. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006).
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26
recover monetary relief for the damages they have sustained.' 1
Employers that commit unfair labor practices are not subject to
such mandatory injunctive orders. 127 If a charge alleging a violation of
section 8(a) by a firm is filed and the Labor Board decides to issue a
complaint, the Board may seek a preliminary injunction against the
offending behavior under section 10(j).128 The Labor Board is not
statutorily obliged to seek such preliminary relief, and if it fails to do so,
the adversely affected employees or labor organization may not compel
relief
that agency to do So. 129 The Board rarely seeks preliminary
1 30
10(j).
section
under
practices
labor
unfair
employer
against
Employers that openly violate the statutory rights of their
employees under the NLRA are generally emboldened by the fact they
consider the relatively minimal costs associated with unfair labor
practice liability to be outweighed by the increased costs they associate
with unionization and collective bargaining. These firms ignore the
moral ramifications of their illegal conduct, and take advantage of the
fact Labor Board remedies with respect to coercive threats and unlawful
terminations are wholly inadequate. There is absolutely no monetary
remedy provided for employer threats. The sole remedy is a final Board
cease and desist order instructing the offending party to refrain from
further violations. The only monetary remedy involves a Board order
requiring employers that have illegally terminated union supporters to
make those individuals whole for the compensation they have lost. Even
this cost is ameliorated by the fact that unlawfully fired employees must
seek interim employment to minimize their economic loss during the
pendency of Board proceedings. 131 The adversely affected individuals
will also be ordered reinstated, but this part of the remedial order is not
very effective. Only about forty percent of discriminatees accept offers
who do, about eighty percent leave their
of reemployment, and, of those
2
13
years.
two
within
employers

126. See 29 U.S.C. § 187. Section 187 makes it unlawful for any labor organization to engage
in unfair labor practices and whoever is injured in violation of this section may sue in any district
court of the United States. Id.
127. 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (2006).
128.

Id.

129.

See Kinney v. Pioneer Press, 881 F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1989).

130. See NLRB, SEVENTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2007 5, 93 (2007). In 2007, 16,291

complaints of employer unfair labor practices were filed. Id. at 5. However, "the Board filed in
district courts a total of 20 petitions for temporary injunctive relief under Section 10(j)." Id. at 93.
131.

See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197-98 (1941).

132. See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under
the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1792 (1983).
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The proposed Employee Free Choice Act ("EFCA") would help to
deter the unlawful termination of union supporters by employers by
33
mandating the award of treble backpay to adversely affected workers.
The increased costs associated with such discharges might deter some
firms from such actions in an effort to avoid enhanced backpay orders.
Treble backpay awards would also help to compensate the dischargees
for the emotional and economic stress associated with such terminations.
Employers that commit flagrant unfair labor practices during union
organizing campaigns may find themselves encumbered by remedial
bargaining orders directing them to recognize and bargain with the
that they
unions involved if those labor organizations can demonstrate
134
obtained majority support despite the firm violations.
Congress should amend section 10(1) of the NLRA to include two
employer unfair labor practices within the area covered by mandatory
temporary restraining orders while the charges are being litigated before
the Board. Whenever discriminatory discharge claims are filed under
section 8(a)(3) and the preliminary investigation indicates that the
charges are meritorious, the Board should be required to seek
preliminary injunctive orders reinstating the discriminatees. If such
individuals could be returned to their former employment environments
on an expedited basis, the lingering impact of their terminations would
be minimal. They could continue their pro-union proselytizing and
encourage their fellow workers to support them.
I have been told by union organizers and union attorneys that most
labor organizations do not petition for Labor Board elections unless they
have obtained authorization cards signed by fifty, sixty, or even seventy
percent of employees in proposed bargaining units. Nonetheless, unions
continue to prevail in about sixty percent of Board elections.'35 This is
due primarily to the fact employers have such a communication
advantage during the time it takes for the Labor Board to schedule
representation elections.
Labor supporters in Congress have endeavored to eliminate this
imbalance through provisions in the proposed EFCA. 136 EFCA provides
for the majority status of organizing unions to be determined by the

133.
134.

Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 1409, 111 th Cong. § 2(b)(1) (2009).
See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) (empowering the NLRB to order

bargaining where an employer committed unfair labor practices that made holding a fair election
unlikely).
135. See Michelle Amber, 2008 Union Win Rate Rises to 66.8 Percent, as Number of NLRB
Elections also Increases,Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) B-2 tbl.1 (May 5, 2009).

136.

H.R. 1409, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
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Labor Board based upon card-check certification.' 37 Union organizers
and their unit supporters would solicit authorization cards from
employees unequivocally indicating that those individuals would like to
38
have formal representation by the designated labor organization.'
Once a majority of unit personnel have executed such cards, the union
could petition the Labor Board for certification.' 39
Employer groups strongly oppose this aspect of EFCA, contending
that true industrial democracy can only be preserved through secret
ballot elections. 40 They suggest that employees may be coerced into
signing authorization cards by threatening organizers or social
pressures. 14 1 They equate Labor Board representation elections with
political elections, failing to acknowledge the undue economic influence
possessed by employers compared to federal, state, and local
politicians. 142 When people vote in political elections, they do not fear
that the outcomes may directly affect their future job security. On the
other hand, they recognize that their employers, which have
unequivocally expressed their opposition to union representation, may
lay off workers or completely close unionized facilities. It should thus
be clear that Labor Board elections are not free from such undue
considerations.
When I have spoken to EFCA opponents who extol the virtue of
secret ballot elections, they become quite upset when I suggest that the
salaries and bonuses paid to corporate executives should be determined
by secret ballot elections conducted with shareholders. While they
maintain that secret ballot elections should be required for employees
contemplating the selection of exclusive bargaining agents, they do not

137. ld.§2.
138. Harrison G. Darby, Margaret R. Bryant, When unions knock, how should employers
answer?,
HR
MAGAZINE,
July,1997,
available
at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mim3495/isn7v42/ai 19814877/.
139. EFCA, H.R. 1409, 111 th Cong. § 2 (2009). Currently, under the NLRA if at least thirty
percent of employees petition the Board, the Board is to take a secret ballot. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)
(2006).
140. Gordon Lafer, What's More Democratic Than A Secret Ballot? The Casefor Majority
Sign-Up, 11 WORKINGUSA 71, 71-72 (2008). "[T]he response of the bill's opponents was a nearunanimous drumbeat ... EFCA denies workers the right to a secret-ballot election and therefore,
violates the most fundamental norms of democracy." Id. at 71.
141. Id. at 82-83 (arguing that "if employees vote to organize despite management's
objections, virtually all aspects of their work lives remain under the control of the management they
have opposed.").
142. Id. at 82. Lafer analogizes the NLRB election process to federal elections throughout his
article. However, he goes on to argue that "[iln political terms, management is a government that
can never be voted out of office; this is one of the irreducible facts that makes the electoral analogy
fall apart." Id.
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think that shareholders should possess the right to vote in secret ballot
elections on issues of corporate significance. Most of these persons
appear to believe that unions have never been able to obtain Labor Board
certification except through secret ballot elections.
They fail to
appreciate the fact that the original NLRA authorized the certification of
labor unions based upon signed authorization cards,43 until the 1947
statutory amendments, without significant difficulties. 1
Supporters of EFCA contend that the Labor Board election process
is tainted by employer economic power, which is frequently used to
intimidate employees contemplating unionization.1 44 They suggest that
reliance upon authorization cards would provide a fairer way to
determine whether a majority of employees really desire union
representation.1 45 Opponents assert that some workers would be induced
to sign authorization cards based on overt union coercion or subtle forms
of social pressure. 146 Overt coercion would clearly contravene section
8(b)(1)(A) 147 and render the improperly obtained cards invalid. While it
is true that some workers may feel social pressure to sign authorization
cards if many coworkers support union organizing campaigns, such
social pressure is likely to be far less significant than the fear of job
losses anti-union employers might express. As a result of their
economic dependence on continued employment, employees tend to be
far more influenced by coercive employer tactics than by improper
behavior by union supporters.
Employer groups maintain that unions would be able to obtain
authorization card signatures from employees before targeted employers
148
would be able to explain the negative aspects of union representation.
143. COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, HOW THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT
WORKS: THE MAJORITY SIGN-UP PROVISION (2009), http://edlabor.house.gov/how-the-employee-

free-choice-act-works-the-majority-sign-up-provision/index.shtml.
144. Eric Brown, Facts About the EFCA, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Feb. 2,2009,
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2009/feb/02/facts-about-efca/.
145.

AFL-CIO,

EMPLOYEE

FREE

CHOICE

ACT

QUESTIONS

AND

ANSWERS

(2009),

http://www.aflcio.org/joinaunion/voiceatwork/efca/qna.cfm (finding that "majority sign-up is a fair
and democratic way for workers to make their own decisions and that this process results in less
hostility and polarization in the workplace than the current government procedures, with their builtin delays and opportunities for company intimidation and harassment.").
146. James Sherk & Paul Kersey, How the Employee Free Choice Act Takes Away Workers'
Rights,
BACKGROUNDER
#2027,
March
4,
2009,
available
at
http://www.heritage.org/research/labor/bg2027.cfm (arguing that "[clard-check campaigns expose
workers to union threats and harassment and pressure them to commit after hearing a one-sided
union sales pitch. Cards collected under those circumstances often do not reflect employees' free
choice.").
147. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (2006) (proscribing union interference with protected employee
rights).
148. Sherk & Kersey, supra note 146. "Even when union organizers do not threaten workers,
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Employers clearly have the right to express their views in this regard, so
long as their statements are not coercive, 149 and employees in proposed
bargaining units should have the right to hear the pros and cons of
unionization before they decide what to do in this regard.
Most employers learn fairly early about incipient union organizing
campaigns from their own employees who mention such endeavors to
supervisory personnel. Nonetheless, labor organizations would still have
several days to obtain signatures before employers could prepare their
50
anti-union campaigns and express their sentiments to their employees.'
To offset this factor, Congress could include a provision in EFCA that
would require labor organizations seeking bargaining rights through
authorization cards to notify targeted firms-and the appropriate
Regional Offices of the Labor Board-of their planned campaigns. The
statute could provide that only authorization cards signed after
employers have received such notice would be considered when
determining whether to extend bargaining rights to the unions involved.
To avoid the improper forward-dating of cards signed by individuals
before such employer notification, labor organizations could be required
to obtain Labor Board imprints on the cards they plan to use when they
initially notify employers and Labor Board offices of their anticipated
campaigns. In exchange for their right to be notified of incipient union
organizing drives, Congress might contemplate the recent proposal by
Representative Joe Sestak (D. Pa.) that would require employers to
provide unions with the same means of communication being used by
employers to oppose organizing efforts.' 5'
Employers opposed to card-check certifications maintain that since
some employees may be induced to sign authorization cards due to overt
coercion or more subtle social pressure, bargaining rights may be
extended to labor organizations that do not really have majority
support. 152 To avoid such a result, Congress could modify the current
EFCA bill to require a weighted majority before bargaining rights would
be extended by the Labor Board. Unions could be required to sign up
sixty, seventy, or even seventy-five percent of individuals in particular
bargaining units before certification could be provided. Such an
approach would greatly diminish the likelihood that exclusive bargaining
card checks often do not reveal workers' free and considered choice about joining a union because
workers do not hear both sides' pitches and lack of time of reflection." Id.
149. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (proscribing employers from coercing employees in the
exercise of their statutory rights).
150. EFCA, H.R. 1409, 111 th Cong. § 2 (2009); see also Sherk & Kersey, supra note 146.
151. See H.R. 1355, 11
lth Cong. §4 (2009).
152. Sherk & Kersey, supra note 146.
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rights would be granted to unions that did not actually possess majority
employee support.
Members of Congress who think that only secret ballot elections
should be employed to grant certification to labor unions might consider
a secret ballot alternative that would require the Labor Board to conduct
elections within five or ten days after election petitions have been filed.
This is the practice followed by several Canadian provinces. 53 Such an
approach would significantly shorten the fifty to sixty days most
employers currently have to conduct their anti-union campaigns prior to
Board elections.154 Both employers and labor organizations would have
sufficient time to disseminate their pro- and anti-union messages, and
the use of such expedited elections would decrease the ability of
employers to improperly influence potential voters through express or
implicit job loss statements.
When labor organizations have earned representation rights through
Labor Board elections, employers often refuse to recognize the validity
of the Board certifications. 155 They file post certification objections
challenging the validity of the elections and delaying the union
certifications before Regional Directors and, in some cases, through
appeals to the Board itself.156 After these representation procedures have
been exhausted, the companies still refuse to recognize the certified
unions, forcing the affected labor organizations to file refusal to bargain
charges.
During the resulting Board proceedings, the employers
challenge the validity of the union certifications. Even though the Board
does not permit such parties to relitigate the certification issues resolved
in the prior proceedings, administrative law judges ("ALJs") must still
conduct hearings to be sure the parties are subject to Board jurisdiction
before they issue remedial bargaining orders. The AU decisions are
then appealed to the Labor Board. Once the Board affirms the AU
decisions, the employers appeal or refuse to comply forcing the Labor
Board to seek court of appeals enforcement. This entire post-election
process may take two or even three years, during which time the
employees who selected representative unions have seen no benefits.' 57
153.

See Gould, supra note 109, at 317.

154. See id. at 315. Currently, "approximately 80% of the representation proceedings are
completed within fifty to sixty days .. " Id.
155. Michael C. Harper, The Case for Limiting Judicial Review of Labor Board Certification
Decisions, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 262, 270 (1987). "In fact, employers do obtain judicial review
of a significant number of certification decisions.
Employers regularly challenge, often
successfully, almost all types of decisions rendered during the certification process." Id. (citations
omitted).
156. See id. at 269 n.34.
157. One way to shorten this extended process would be to make Labor Board certification
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One way to minimize the impact of such employer delays would be
to amend section 10(1) to require the Labor Board to seek preliminary
injunctive orders requiring the offending employers to recognize and
bargain with the affected labor organizations whenever the Board
determines that the employer challenges to the certification process are
clearly without merit. This would compel the firms to sit down quickly
with the prevailing unions to negotiate. While this would not require
them to achieve bargaining agreements, it would place them at
significant risk if the district courts issuing the section 10(1) injunctive
orders determined that the firms were not bargaining in good faith.
When unions obtain Labor Board certifications and are prevented
from bargaining for several years while employers exhaust all available
appeal procedures, the employees who selected such representatives
sustain meaningful and calculable monetary damages.1 58 If the firms had
recognized the newly certified unions following their selection and
bargained in good faith, there is a good chance the parties would have
achieved collective contracts that would have enhanced the wages and
fringe benefits enjoyed by unit personnel. In NLRB v. Tiidee Products,
the court held that the Labor Board was empowered to make such
individuals whole for their economic losses where the employer
challenges to the election results were clearly without merit by
determining what wages and benefits they would most likely have
obtained had the employers bargained in good faith and award such
relief to the affected employees. 59 In Ex-Cell-O Corp.,l60 however, the
Board rejected this approach and held that it lacked the statutory
authority to award such monetary relief due to the fact that there would
be no way of determining (1) if the parties would have achieved a first
contract and (2) what the economic terms would have been had they
done so.161
If section 10(1) were amended to require preliminary district court
bargaining orders while representation issues are being litigated by
dissatisfied employers in unfair labor practice proceedings, the adversely
orders "final." Board orders subject to immediate judicial review or enforcement. This would avoid
the delay caused while ALJs and the Board consider refusal to bargain claims resulting from
employer refusals to honor the certifications. Nonetheless, employers refusing to recognize the
validity of Board certifications could still delay the bargaining process for a year or more while they
appeal or force the Board to petition courts of appeal to resolve certification issues.
158. See generally NLRB v. Tiidee Products, 426 F.2d 1243, 1253 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that the
employers should pay retroactive damages to employees because the employer should not be able to
profit by delaying the bargaining process and illegally refusing to engage in collective bargaining).
159. Id.
160.
161.

185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970).
Id. at I10.
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affected employees would suffer minimal economic losses if their
respective unions and employers were to immediately bargain in good
faith over initial contracts.
It would be inappropriate to punish
employers seeking meaningful judicial review of Board certifications to
impose somewhat speculative make-whole remedies. Nonetheless,
Congress should consider amendments that would authorize the Board to
award such relief for manifestly unjustified refusals to honor clearly
valid Board certifications. How would administrative law judges
determine what delaying employers might have agreed to if they had
bargained with newly certified unions in good faith? They could rely
upon Bureau of Labor Statistics data indicating what unionized firms of
a similar nature provide to their employees in this particular
geographical area. Such remedies would be inherently speculative, since
it would never be clear that the parties would ever have achieved first
contracts. In addition, even Bureau of Labor Statistics data could not
demonstrate exactly what the parties would have agreed upon had they
bargained in good faith. An alternative would be for Congress to adopt
procedures designed to assist newly certified labor organizations obtain
their own initial contracts.
C. Proceduresto Help Newly Certified Unions Obtain Initial Contracts
The proposed EFCA would endeavor to deal with situations in
which newly certified labor organizations find it difficult to negotiate
first contracts by mandating mediation assistance when negotiating
parties are unable to achieve contracts within ninety days and first offer
interest arbitration if they are still not able to reach agreement after thirty
additional days. 162 This is a controversial provision, because it is not
clear when or if the parties would have ever obtained a first contracteven if both sides had bargained in complete good faith. This is
especially true with respect to weak unions dealing with employers in
highly competitive fields where increased labor costs could significantly
affect their ability to remain in operation. Whenever such labor
organizations began to think that they could not achieve much success at
the bargaining table, they would find it easy to delay the negotiation
process until the time for binding contract arbitration arose.
If first contract arbitration were to be statutorily mandated after 120
days, Congress should decide what standards should be employed by
arbitrators. Should they be empowered to dictate any initial terms they
think appropriate or should their discretion be circumscribed? Congress
162.

See EFCA, H.R. 1409, 111 th Cong. § 3(h)(3) (2009).
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should instruct them to consider what similar firms in the relevant
geographical areas are providing their employees with respect to wages,
fringe benefits, and other working conditions. They would examine the
health care, pension plans, union security provisions, management rights
clauses, grievance-arbitration procedures, and similar terms provided by
comparable companies. To further restrict arbitrator discretion, the
neutral adjudicators should be required to choose between the final
offers tendered by the employers and labor organizations involved based
upon the reasonableness of the relevant proposals. This could be
accomplished on a total package basis or on an issue-by-issue basis. I
would recommend the issue-by-issue approach to enable arbitrators to
select-issue-by-issue-the more reasonable of the proposals being
advanced by labor and management. Such a final offer approach would
encourage bargaining parties to make reasonable proposals to each other
if they hope to prevail in any necessary arbitral proceedings. It would
diminish the likelihood of binding arbitration, with the parties often
being able to reach their own accords as they narrowed the distance
remaining between their respective positions in preparation for possible
arbitration.
The interest arbitration procedures included in the proposed EFCA
would cover the first two years of labor and management
relationships.1 6 3 If the parties worked together during this period, their
relationship should mature, with each appreciating the needs and
interests of the other. By the end of this initial period, it should be much
easier for representative labor organizations to negotiate subsequent
agreements without the need for further congressional assistance.
Members of Congress who do not feel comfortable with binding
The neutral
arbitration might consider non-binding arbitration.
adjudicators would conduct hearings, determine the relevant facts, and
make non-binding, but public, recommendations to the parties. The
labor and management representatives would then be obliged to return to
the bargaining table. The public arbitral findings and recommendations
would put pressure on the negotiating parties to seek agreements in line
with the arbitral suggestions.
III. UNION APPEALS TO NEW AGE WORKERS
I have previously suggested that the labor movement needs to
revisit the mid-1930s if it is to reorganize itself in a manner that will

163.

Id.
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enable it to appeal to twenty-first century workers. 164 When the CIO
was formed and industrial unions began to organize manufacturing
employees, labor leaders quickly learned how to appeal to blue-collar
personnel.1 65 They designed campaigns that would encourage those
persons to appreciate the fact that without collective voices they could
not hope to meaningfully influence their employment terms.. 166 They
successfully organized workers in steel, automobile, electrical, rubber,
and other similar industries. It was these efforts that enabled unions to
achieve a membership density of approximately thirty-five percent by
the mid-1950s. 67 Since that time, the private sector union membership
rate has steadily declined to its current 7.2%.168
Many contemporary labor unions continue to use blue-collar
organizing techniques to appeal to new age white-collar, service, and
professional employees. 69 It was a similar problem in the mid-1930s
which induced the Committee for Industrial Organization to split away
from the AFL and form new industrial unions.170 The AFL unions had
been trying to use craft union appeals to homogeneous skilled trades
workers to organize heterogeneous manufacturing employees.' 7' The
CIO unions realized that they had to develop appeals that would entice
skilled, semi-skilled,
and unskilled personnel to join together to achieve
72
common goals.

The formation of the Change to Win coalition should help to
motivate union leaders to contemplate new organizing techniques. As
was true in the late 1930s and early 1940s, inter union competition can

164. Charles B. Craver, The Labor Movement Needs a Twenty-First Century Committee for
Industrial Organization, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 69 (2005). "Leaders must create new
organizations similar to those established in the mid-1930s to deal with the challenging
circumstances they faced then as a result of changes in the American economic system." Id. at 100.
165. See generally GALENSON, supra note 10 (explaining the history of the CIO).
166. Id.
167. See supra text accompanying note 14.
168. Economic News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members Summary (Jan. 22,
2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
169. Cf Victor J. Van Bourg & Ellyn Moscowitz, Salting the Mines: The Legal and Political
Implications of Placing Paid Union Organizers in the Employer's Workplace, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. &

EMP. L.J. 1, 49 (1998) ("Labor stands at a real crossroads. With a new leadership, and a
commitment to rebuilding the labor movement, many new and old organizing strategies must be
reexamined.").
170. See PHILIP TAFT, THE A. F. OF L. FROM THE DEATH OF GOMPERS TO THE MERGER 141
(1959).
171. See generally Keith J. Gross, Separate to Unite: Will Change to Win Strengthen
Organized Labor in America?, 24 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 75, 80 (2006).
172. Id. at 76-77 (noting how the CIO capitalized on the AFL's failure to organize the millions
of unrepresented workers in the steel, auto, and rubber industries. As a result, the CIO was able to
double union membership).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2010

29

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 2

340

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 27:311

be highly beneficial, as different unions work to organize new age
workers.17 3 They must, however, appreciate the fact that twenty-first
century workers do not wish to be considered "working class."'1 74 They
think of themselves as white-collar professionals, even when they have
relatively modest service positions at firms like Wal-Mart. 175 They fear
that membership in traditional labor unions will suggest that they hold
less prestigious positions. 176
If unions hope to appeal successfully to new age workers, they have
to do two things effectively. First, they need to focus on larger firms
like Wal-Mart. Coordinated efforts by AFL-CIO and Change to Win
affiliates might be successful. Most Wal-Mart employees have modest
compensation and limited fringe benefits. 77 If unions like the Service
Employees and the United Food and Commercial Employees were to
work together to target Wal-Mart employees, they might begin to
organize the almost one percent of work force participants who work for
this extraordinarily successful corporation.
To reach Wal-Mart employees, unions must utilize the Internet.
Labor organizations must develop means to obtain the e-mail addresses
of the targeted individuals to enable them to send different e-mail
messages.1 78
They must also encourage targeted employees to
communicate among themselves, whenever possible, through firm email systems, and through external e-mail channels. Mass mailings,
home visits, and telephone calls are unlikely to have the same impact.
New age workers spend hours on the Internet, and almost no time
reading regular mail or talking personally with strangers.
The second thing unions must do is significantly modify their

173.

See generally Craver, supra note 164, at 69-81 (citations omitted).

174.

See generally BARBARA EHRENREICH, FEAR OF FALLING 109-10 (1990) (noting social

science studies that characterized working-class people as narrow-minded and intolerant).
175. See generally Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest and
the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S.CAL. L. REV. 799, 889 (2003) (arguing that since Americans
have little social awareness of class, placing working-class people in wealthy districts may increase
their cultural identification with people of middle-class status and diminish their class
consciousness).
176. Cf Charles Craver, Why Labor Unions Must [and Can] Survive, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 15, 36 (noting the low prestige associated with trade union officials and organizers).
177. See Richard Vedder, Wal-Mart, Individuals and the State, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1725, 172829 (2007) (noting that Wal-Mart pays its workers in accordance with industry standards).
178. See ARTHUR B. SHOSTAK, CYBER UNION: EMPOWERING LABOR THROUGH COMPUTER
TECHNOLOGY 46 (1999) (noting that computers may be used to organize workers); see generally
Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, The National Labor Relations Act in Cyberspace: Union
Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 39 (2000) (noting that a union
organizer could engage in a conversation with prospective members via cyberspace in a non-union
workplace).
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organizing appeals. New age workers wish to preserve a professional
status even if their educational backgrounds and actual employment
circumstances do not warrant such status. These individuals are afraid
of traditional labor unions, since they cannot understand how
organizations that represent truck drivers, assembly line workers, and
janitors could possibly understand and enhance the interests of
professional personnel. They think that if they join such entities, they
will lose their professional status and be viewed as "working class." I
witnessed a perfect example of this phenomenon when the Service
Employees Union was able to organize the adjunct faculty members at
George Washington University. Several adjunct faculty members told
me they could not imagine being in a union that represents janitors!
Despite their desire to be viewed as white-collar professionals, most
service sector employees appreciate the fact they lack individual
bargaining power and would like a collective voice. 17 9 They simply do
not want to become associated with conventional unions. This was
similar to the situation labor organizations faced thirty years ago when
they sought to represent school teachers and nurses. 80 The National
Education Association finally decided to represent teachers, and the
American Nurses Association decided to do the same for nurses. 181
These entities emphasized their professional natures and the fact they
were not "unions."' 182 As a result, teachers and nurses felt comfortable
joining these associations and allowing them to be their bargaining
agents. Even the AFL-CIO affiliate-the American Federation of
Teachers-was careful not to include the term "union" in its title. 83 I
have had many teachers and nurses tell me personally how important it
was to them to be represented by an "association" rather than a "union."
Existing AFL-CIO and Change to Win affiliates can successfully
organize new age workers, if they modify their appeals to reach
individuals who view themselves as white-collar professionals. Instead
of emphasizing traditional wage and fringe benefit issues, which may
still be important to these persons, they need to focus on ways in which
they can enhance their professional credentials. They should talk about
efforts to advance their employment skills to expand their portability in

179. See generally Marion Crain, The Transformation of the Professional Workforce, 79 CHI.KENT L. REV. 543, 599-601 (2004).
180. See generally Todd A. DeMitchell and Casey D. Cobb, Teachers: Their Union and Their
Profession. A Tangled Relationship, 212 ED. L. REP. 1 (2006) (discussing teacher unions and their
tactics).

181. Id. at 3.
182. See id.
183. See generally The American Federation of Teachers, http://www.aft.org.
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areas in which they are unlikely to work for specific firms for more than
a few years before they move on. They must create new entities that are
designed to reflect the hopes and aspirations of people employed in
service, finance, insurance, health care, and technology fields. Just as
the Committee for Industrial Organization created new industrial unions
in the mid-1930s, twenty-first century unions must create new
"professional associations" that will appeal to new age personnel.
An Association of White-Collar Service Employees could be
formed to appeal to individuals employed by firms like Wal-Mart,
Costco, Safeway, and Macy's. Even though wage and health care issues
are of significant interest to these persons, such an association would
need to give them the impression that membership in and representation
by such an entity could further their white-collar professional interests.
It would seek to enhance their employment skills to make them more
portable, and to make it easier for them to move into management. It
might seek to move such persons from hourly wages to monthly salaries
that would make them appear to be more like the managers who
supervise their work.
An Association of Finance Professionals could be formed to
organize employees who work for commercial banks, mortgage entities,
and brokerage houses. An Association of Insurance Professionals could
be created to appeal to the many persons who work in the insurance area.
An Association of Health Care Professionals could be used to organize
the many health care employees who might not fit within the jurisdiction
of the Nurses Association. Individuals employed as nurses aides, patient
attendants, and hospital record keepers could be enticed to join and feel
no loss of status as a result. A similar Association of Intellectual
Property and/or Technology Professionals could be established to appeal
to persons employed by software and hardware firms.
As many of these employees have their employment terms and job
security threatened by the outsourcing of their work to low cost firms in
countries like India and China, they are likely to become more receptive
to collectivization. These professional associations could tailor their
appeals to their particular circumstances by emphasizing the need for
employer-provided training courses designed to keep their skills current
with the latest computer technologies. These associations could also
address the need to limit the outsourcing of jobs to foreign workers
and/or to provide retraining and relocation opportunities for persons
displaced by such outsourcing decisions. Profit sharing and stock option
plans could be negotiated to allow employees in these white-collar
professional positions to share directly in the financial gains they help to
generate.
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The professional associations covering service, finance, insurance,
health care, and technology workers could be semi-autonomous affiliates
of existing unions like the Service Employees. Such an arrangement
would provide these new entities with strong leadership, effective legal
assistance, and a strong financial base. Their status as separate
professional associations would be crucial, however, if they wish to
appeal successfully to new age workers.
Organizers working for these new professional associations would
have to think of new ways to appeal to targeted new age employees.
They would have to forego blue-collar appeals that have been used to
organize production personnel. They should emphasize the fact that
most American businesses have created their own professional
associations to further their economic interests. Groups such as the
United States Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of
Manufacturers represent expansive industries, while narrower entities
represent the plastics, chemical, pharmaceutical, and similar industry
groups. 184 The American Bar Association furthers the interests of
attorneys, while the American Medical Association serves a similar
purpose for physicians.1 85 Rank-and-file employees are the only major
group in the United States without a collective voice. Union leaders of
new professional associations must demonstrate to new age workers how
powerless they are when acting individually. They must either accept
the circumstances established unilaterally by their employers or seek
other employment.
Professional association organizers must emphasize the fact that
shareholders who combine their capital in corporate forms do not view
collectivization as unprofessional or working class. These shareholders
are quintessential capitalists who have combined their economic power
to advance their personal wealth. 86 This is why Congress noted in
section 1 of the NLRA the "inequality of bargaining power between
employees who do not possess full freedom of association . . . and
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of
ownership ....,,87 Organizers need to convince new age workers that
only through a collective voice can they hope to achieve employment
terms that will reflect their true contributions to their respective firms.
Professional association officials must appreciate the fact that many

184.

See BRUCE E. KAUFMAN, THE GLOBAL EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: EVENTS,

IDEAS, AND THE IIRA 134-35, 221 (2004).
185. See generally Crain, supra note 179.
186. See generally Craver, supra note 164, at 93.
187. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
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new age workers do not wish to join or be represented by organizations
that plan to foster conventional adversarial relationships with their
employers.' 88 They would prefer more cooperative arrangements. In an
increasingly competitive global economy, it is imperative that employee
representatives cooperate with United States firms to maintain
economically successful businesses. They need not do this, however, at
the expense of the employees.
Over the past thirty years, shareholder wealth and managerial
compensation have grown steadily, while employee wages and benefits
have barely kept pace with inflation.' 89 Generous health care coverage
has been diluted or eliminated, and beneficial defined benefit pension
systems have been replaced by defined contribution 401 (k) plans.190 It is
imperative to recognize that the rights and benefits of individual
employees have declined directly with the decline in union density
rates.' 9' If unions were to completely disappear, individual workers
would be powerless.
Corporate employers would control their
employment terms and continue to reduce the percentage of firm profits
shared with regular workers.
If unions hope to survive and counterbalance the power possessed
by increasingly larger business firms, they must convince employees of
the need for a collective voice to advance their interests. If they
continue to do this through traditional blue-collar appeals, they will fail
and twenty-first century workers will suffer. On the other hand, if they
can create new professional associations designed to appeal to new age
white-collar professionals, they could reverse their decline and expand
their overall base. If they could do this successfully, they could achieve
union membership rates of twenty-five, thirty, or even thirty-five percent
over the coming years. They could return to the hay days of the late
1940s and 1950s. They might even exceed the degree of union density,
which existed during those time frames.
IV. MANDATORY WORKER PARTICIPATION
Even if the labor movement was able to create new professional
associations that would appeal to new age workers and significantly
increase the percentage of workers represented by bargaining agents,
millions of employees would decide not to join such organizations. As a

188.
189.
190.
191.

See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 47, at 148-149.
See generally GREENHOUSE, supra note 43.
Id.
Id.at242-43.
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result they would lack any meaningful way to influence their basic
employment terms. If such persons are to be provided with a significant
voice, Congress would have to enact a new statute mandating some form
of worker participation.
I have regularly heard corporate officials claim that their human
capital is their most important firm resource. They often look for ways
to make those persons more loyal and productive workers. Many have
sought to accomplish this through shop level employee involvement
programs.192 Such programs may be called "production teams" or
"quality of work life programs."' 93 These mechanisms are designed to
enhance communication between management and employees to
improve the quality of the products or services being provided and to
increase worker productivity. American business leaders appreciate the
fact that firms in countries like Germany and Japan have used employee
involvement committees to improve their positions in increasingly
194
competitive global markets, and they hope to achieve similar benefits.
Many of the worker participation programs already established by
business firms technically violate section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA,' 95 which
makes it unlawful for an employer to dominate "labor organizations."
Section 2(5) of that Act' 96 expansively defines "labor organization" to
include formal and informal employee committees that "deal with"
employers with respect to "grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."' 197 Even informal
worker committees that act in a representative capacity on behalf of
other workers and which deal with employers with respect to such
matters constitute covered "labor organizations," and if employers
exercise any meaningful control over their creation and/or operation, this
contravenes section 8(a)(2). 198
To eliminate such section 8(a)(2) difficulties, employers sought the
enactment of the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act ("TEAM
Act"), 199 which would have amended the NLRA to provide employers
with greater freedom in this area. The TEAM Act was approved by the
192. See Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union" Prohibition:
The Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125, 137-38 (1994).
193. See generally Michael Maccoby, Helping Labor and Management Set Up a Quality-ofWorklife Program, 107 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 28 (1984).

194. See Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 936-40 (1993).
195. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2006).
196. Id. § 152(5).
197. Id.
198. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
199. H.R. 743, 104th Cong. (1996); S. 295, 104th Cong. (1996).
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House and Senate, but was vetoed by President Clinton.2 00 President
Clinton was not opposed to worker participation programs per se, but
thought that the TEAM Act failed to protect employee interests.2 0, The
proposed statute would have allowed employers to use such employee
programs to enhance productivity and quality with minimal direct
benefit to employees. Corporate managers would have been able to
determine committee structures and agendas, without any concurrent
obligation to allow workers to initiate discussions pertaining to more
expansive issues.
Business leaders frequently complain about the lack of employee
commitment to firm objectives. What they fail to appreciate is the fact
that as employees-at-will such individuals feel almost no firm loyalty
toward them. They can be laid off or terminated at any time for almost
any reason. The at-will doctrine and the absence of worker involvement
in the managerial decision-making process makes employees feel
insecure.20 z Employees reasonably fear that recommended productivity
enhancements will be rewarded-not by greater firm appreciation and
monetary rewards-but by layoffs generated by the need for fewer
workers.20 3 Employees also think that quality enhancements will be
used to advance shareholder equities and managerial bonuses, but will
not result in gain sharing for the workers involved.20 4
Corporate leaders who want to improve employee morale should
recognize the potential benefits of meaningful worker participation
programs. Through such institutions, employees could gain a greater
appreciation for the competitive pressures challenging twenty-first
century businesses, and firms could obtain valuable input from their
knowledgeable workers.
Federal legislation could authorize
appropriately structured employee involvement committees to oversee
firm compliance with safety and health regulations, wage and hour laws,
civil rights statutes, and similar enactments. Cooperative employee
involvement plans could also replace traditionally adversarial labor-

200. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) AA-1 (July 31, 1996).
201. See Press Release, AFL-CIO, President Clinton's Veto of the So-Called Team Act (July
31, 1996) (on file with Hofstra Labor and Employment Journal).
202. See LESTER THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD 137-40 (1992) (arguing that employees are treated
like chattel serfs).
203.

See Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporationfor the Long

Term, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 513, 575-79 (1993) (discussing the impact of takeovers and
restructuring on staff reductions).
204. See Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts:
Recognizing a FiduciaryDuty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1210 (1991)
(discussing the "expropriation theory," which suggests that corporate restructuring generates
corporate profits at the expense of employees).
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management arrangements.
Congress must acknowledge that corporate success is dependent
upon three symbiotic groups: (1) shareholders who provide the
necessary capital; (2) managers who provide the required leadership; and
(3) employees who generate the ultimate products or services.
Shareholders are protected by federal and state securities laws that
require corporations to provide shareholders with extensive information
regarding firm operations, allow them to participate directly in the
election of corporate directors, and which impose fiduciary duties on
corporate managers. °5 Shareholders also have the ability to diversify
their stock holdings to ensure that no one firm can significantly affect
their overall portfolios.
Corporate managers are able to protect
themselves from corporate vicissitudes through access to confidential
firm information and their ability to make decisions that affect their own
job security. Most corporate managers have long term contracts that
guarantee them employment for extended periods as well as generous
severance packages. They directly benefit from firm success through
bonus payments and stock option plans that are unavailable to most
rank-and-file employees.
Regular workers enjoy almost no such
benefits. They may commit their working lives to firm success, but
normally receive almost no direct benefits for their efforts beyond their
base salaries and their basic fringe benefits. They have neither access to
critical firm information, nor influence over important corporate
decisions affecting their employment destinies.
It is time for Congress to acknowledge that "[t]he essence of
industrial democracy is the right of employees to influence decisions
affecting their working lives. 20 6 To accomplish this objective, Congress
should enact an employer-employee relations act guaranteeing
employees significant input with respect to business decisions that
directly affect their employment situations.
Many European nations have established different types of

205.

See Kenneth M. Rosen, Fiduciaries,58 ALA. L. REv. 1041 (2006) (discussing fiduciary

duties of managers as reflected in business corporation law and common law manifestations of
equity); see also Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928) ("A trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior."); see also Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat.
74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa) (2006) (including provisions, such as subsection
(aa), requiring the disclosure of corporate financial information before being able to sale securities,
under a theory that the information better protects the investors or shareholders).
206. R. Willis, Minister for Employment and Industrial Relations, 3 EMP. PARTICIPATION
NEwS 8 (1984), quoted in Lord Wedderburn, Trust, Corporation and the Worker, 23 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 203, 249 (1985).
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employee involvement programs. 0 7 Most of these plans have included
shop level groups that focus on issues ranging from production and
service methods to broader employment issues. These local bodies
address topics of immediate interest to regular employees. A few
worker participation programs provide for worker representation on
corporate boards. 20 8 This approach guarantees direct employee input
when business firms are making fundamental corporate decisions that
could directly affect employment concerns.
The United States prides itself in being a model democratic nation.
Members of the general public have the ability to influence federal,
state, and local executive and legislative activities through the direct
election of mayors, governors, the President, city council members, state
legislators, and members of Congress.
On the other hand, in
employment settings, America is one of the least democratic countries.
Although employees are empowered to select exclusive bargaining
agents to express their concerns, the vast majority of private sector
employees no longer enjoy such representation even though almost
ninety percent would like to have some type of collective voice.20 9
Congress should create a legislative scheme that would provide
regular employees and lower level managers with basic employment
dignity and meaningful industrial democracy.
Such a legislative
program could only be effectively established by Congress. If individual
states were to create such participation programs, they would risk the
relocation of corporations to less intrusive jurisdictions. It would not be
sufficient to simply enact something like the previously considered
TEAM Act, because such a law would allow companies to establish
employee committees designed to enhance product or service quality
and worker productivity, with no reciprocal benefit to the employees
themselves.
What incentives might be used to induce business firms to
appreciate the benefits employers might derive from a mandatory worker
participation law? Effective employee participation programs should
advance productivity, quality, and worker morale. Employee turnover
should decline, making it economically advantageous for firms to accept

207. See generally WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION, AND COOPERATION
IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck, eds., 1995) [hereinafter WORKS
COUNCILS] (explaining the different programs for employee involvement in Germany, The
Netherlands, France, Spain, Sweden, Italy and Poland).
208. See Robert Tchnobanian, France: From Conflict to Social Dialogue?, in WORKS
COUNCILS 115, supra note 207, at 129; Gdran Brulin, Sweden: Joint Councils Under Strong
Unionism, in WORKS COUNCILS 189, supra note 207, at 197.
209. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 47, 151-52.
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the costs associated with expanded firm-specific worker training. If
employees were pleased with the input they would have through such
legislated participation programs, they might decide not to view union
representation as a necessary alternative.
As the percentage of private sector workers in labor organizations
has declined, diminishing the degree to which basic employment terms
have been determined through the collective bargaining process, state
legislatures, Congress, and judges have expanded the protections
available to individual employees. 2 10 As part of a mandated worker
participation scheme, Congress could authorize local worker committees
to oversee compliance with federal and state employment standards and
to even grant waivers from some such regulations when warranted by
appropriate local considerations.
Cooperative employee involvement programs could benefit both
workers and their employers. Committees could ensure that firms
consider the "human aspects" of corporate operations when they make
decisions that could directly affect worker interests. This would provide
employees with a feeling of respect and a satisfaction associated with
their capacity to influence business decisions directly affecting their
employment destinies.2 1' Such programs would also further employeremployee equality by correcting the present information and decisionmaking imbalance which allows managers to act opportunistically at the
expense of information-deprived workers.2 12
Corporate officials need to appreciate the fact that rank-and-file
employees frequently understand their functions more than the managers
who supervise their work. Such employees are thus quite capable of
developing plans that would enhance product or service quality and firm
productivity. Why do they not strive to do so within existing corporate
structures? They reasonably fear that such improvements would be
likely to undermine their own job security. If businesses could be
induced to treat their workers as partners in a cooperative venture and
those individuals were allowed to share in company advancements,
employees would be more inclined to suggest and support beneficial
operational modifications.
A mandatory worker participation program would not be a
substitute for representative unions. Employee committees would not be
210. Samuel Estreicher, Trade Unionism Under Globalization: The Demise of Voluntarism? 3
(2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with NELLCO).
211.

See JAMES C. FURLONG, LABOR IN THE BOARDROOM: THE PEACEFUL REVOLUTION 91

(1977); A.H. Raskin, Toward a More ParticipativeWork Force, in WORKING INTHE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 90, 97 (C. Stewart Sheppard & Donald C. Carroll, eds., 1980).
212. See O'Connor, supra note 204, at 937.
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authorized to negotiate over wages, hours, and working conditions, even
though they could influence those topics. In addition, such committees
would not possess the right to strike. Where labor organizations
presently represent employees, those unions could work with employee
participation committees to further worker interests. Where employees
are currently not represented, effective employee committees might
induce those workers to appreciate the more direct participation they
could derive from the selection of formal bargaining agents. As a result,
formal worker participation programs might help to expand-rather than
contract-conventional union representation.
A. Shop Level Employee Involvement Committees
Congress should enact a statute that would require all employers
with more than a minimum number of regular employees-perhaps
twenty-five or fifty-to establish employee involvement committees.
The law should require at least one committee for each separate facility
with more than twenty-five employees. These committees could consist
of at least five to ten employees, depending on the overall number of
workers involved.
Large facilities employing several hundred
employees would be required to create subcommittees for each distinct
department or group of interrelated departments whose workers share
common employment interests. Multiple plant corporations should be
obliged to create enterprise level employee involvement committees,
comprised of individuals elected by the members of the different plant
level involvement committees.
Every two or three years, employees would nominate and elect, by
secret ballot procedures, the members of the different involvement
committees. To enhance the interests of lower and middle management
personnel who often find their employment interests more aligned with
regular employees than with corporate managers, such persons should be
authorized to elect one-quarter or one-fifth of committee members.
Corporate leaders would also be permitted to appoint several
involvement committee members to enable regular committee members
to communicate directly with upper management representatives.
The statute should require firms to provide employee involvement
committees with information pertaining to both basic operations and
contemplated firm changes that could significantly affect working
conditions and/or employee job security. The appropriate employee
involvement committee or subcommittee would have the authority to
consider proposed corporate changes that would affect basic operations
or would involve the introduction of new technology, job restructuring,
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health and safety concerns, significant job or production relocations,
213
group layoffs, and individual terminations. The full committees would
consider issues of general concern, while subcommittees would focus on
topics affecting their particular groups. Management officials would be
obliged to consult with employee involvement committees before taking
specific action in an effort to generate mutually acceptable outcomes.
In most instances, employee involvement committees and managers
should be able to agree upon the appropriate courses of action.
Committee members would appreciate the need for corporate efficiency
and enhanced quality if firms are to remain competitive in the global
economy. They should also acknowledge that redundant or incompetent
persons could not continue to be employed without threatening the job
security of all employees. On the other hand, managers would have a
better understanding of worker concerns and would obtain important
input from the persons directly involved with the operations in question.
Congress could provide that when a weighted majority of employee
involvement committee members oppose proposed managerial action,
mediators with business experience could be brought in to assist the
parties with their discussions. Time limits could be imposed to ensure
that mediation efforts would not continue for prolonged periods. After
business managers have consulted with committee members and
participated in the decision-making process in good faith, they could be
empowered to unilaterally implement proposals that have been rejected
by committee members. This practice would be similar to that currently
followed under the NLRA where bargaining parties are unable to
achieve mutual accords and bargaining impasses are reached.' 14 Such an
approach would not unduly restrict managerial freedom, but it would
require firms to obtain input from and consult with employee
involvement committees before they effectuated decisions of direct
interest to workers.
Questions pertaining to the propriety of significant discipline
imposed on employees could be subject to involvement committee
review. In most cases, committee members would either accept the
discipline imposed or induce management officials to modify or
eliminate the penalties imposed. In the few cases in which no such
agreements could be reached, Congress could require the matter to be
sent to arbitration for final review. Traditional employment-at-will
concepts should be replaced with more conventional "just cause"

213. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 285-86 (1990).

214. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
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standards limiting the imposition of discipline to persons whose conduct
is clearly inappropriate. To protect the right of businesses to discipline
marginal or disruptive employees, Congress could reject the
conventional American arbitral practice of requiring employers to
demonstrate valid reasons for discipline imposed.2 15 It could instead
require grieving employees to establish the absence of any reasonable
basis for the discipline imposed.
Congress could help to reduce the expanding cost of judicial
litigation by authorizing employee involvement committees to supervise
the enforcement of safety and health regulations, wage and hour laws,
family and medical leave provisions, civil rights laws, and similar
employment statutes. Regular committee monitoring would be far more
effective than the current system where understaffed federal and state
agencies can only rarely visit covered facilities. Most employee
challenges under these employment laws would be resolved amicably
through discussions between committee members and management
officials. In those rare instances in which mutual accords could not be
achieved, Congress could provide for arbitral resolutions that would be
subject to minimal judicial review.
B. Board ofDirectorParticipation
Shop-level employee involvement committees would only provide
workers with limited participation rights. Even though these institutions
would significantly increase employee involvement with respect to daily
decisions affecting their particular situations, they would not affect
important decisions made by top corporate officials. If workers are to be
provided with the ability to meaningfully influence upper-management
decision-making, legislation would have to provide them with board of
director representation.2 16
Congress should acknowledge the significant contribution to firm
success made by regular employees by mandating that one-fifth, onequarter, or one-third of corporate board members be elected by nonexecutive personnel. Such a statute would provide both rank-and-file
employees and lower-level managers with the right to nominate and
elect worker representatives to corporate boards. This would guarantee
that such boards consider worker interests when they debate and decide

215. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 948-53 (Alan Miles Rubin ed., 6th
ed. 2003).
216. See Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for
Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 93-94 (1993).
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upon important firm policies. It would also encourage board members to
look for ways to minimize the negative impact of decisions on
employees.
Worker elected board members should not only serve the interest of
employees. Both these board members and the shareholder elected
directors should have a dual fiduciary obligation. All directors should be
required to consider both shareholder and worker interests when they
make business determinations, and they should be liable to employees or
shareholders if they violate their fiduciary obligations to either group.21 7
Corporate boards have historically had a fiduciary obligation solely
to advance the economic interests of shareholders.218 In more recent
years, however, courts, legislators, and scholars have begun to question
this single-minded fiduciary duty approach, suggesting that board
members may consider groups other than just shareholders.2 19 One of
groups most deserving of fiduciary protection include the employees
who labor for their corporate employers. Unlike shareholders who can
diversify their holdings, workers devote their lives to the firms that
employ them. Poor corporate decisions can jeopardize both their job
security and their pension funds that often contain a significant amount
of employer firm stock. Their contribution to company success is as
substantial as the contributions of shareholders. It would thus be entirely
appropriate for Congress to impose upon corporate boards-and top firm
managers-a fiduciary obligation that would protect the interests of both
shareholders and workers.
Although board members and top managers should have a dual
fiduciary duty toward shareholders and employees, such firm leaders
should have sufficient discretion to enable them to make good faith
decisions when shareholder and employee interests conflict, without fear
of personal liability. Congress could incorporate the "business judgment
rule" to provide board members and managers with sufficient freedom to
enable them to make controversial determinations. 220 Liability would

217. See id. at 93-95.
218. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see also Adolf A. Berle,
Jr., For Whom CorporateManagers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1365 (1932).
See generally ADOLPF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 194-206 (Macmillan 1933) (1932) (discussing ways in which directors can
affect the earnings of shareholders).
219. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West 2004); Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v.
Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989); see aLso Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical
Frameworkfor Enforcing CorporateConstituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 580 n.2 (1992).
220. HARRY G. HENN, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 508 (2d ed. 1986). "Business judgment thus,
by definition, presupposes an honest, unbiased judgment (compliance with fiduciary duty)
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not be imposed on corporate officials who could demonstrate that they
fairly considered the interests of adversely affected constituencies and
acted in good faith when they made the decisions being challenged.
Nonetheless, if it could be shown that they failed to consider worker
interests or acted to further selfish personal or shareholder interests at
the expense of employees, liability should be imposed as it would if they
had failed to properly consider the interests of shareholders.
The right of employees to elect corporate board members and the
imposition of dual fiduciary duties on such boards and on top managers
toward both shareholders and workers would not guarantee that
employee interests would always prevail. Nor would it unduly limit the
freedom corporate officials need to advance the economic interests of
their institutions. It would merely guarantee that such parties would
fairly consider worker interests when they make firm decisions that
could significantly affect the future interests of employees.
V. CONCLUSION
When the NLRA was enacted in 1935, only 13.2% of
nonagricultural employees were union members, and most were craft
workers in AFL unions. Soon after the NLRA went into effect, the CIO
was formed and it created a group of industrial unions that organized the
emerging production industries. By the mid-1950s, thirty-five percent of
workers were union members. The AFL and CIO unions united, and
ceased competing with one another to organize employees. The NLRA
was significantly amended both in 1947 and 1959 to limit the persons
covered by that Act and to restrict the economic weapons available to
labor organizations.
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, labor costs at unionized firms
had increased and employers began to look for ways to eliminate
representative labor organizations. Unions also began to lose members
as America was transformed from a manufacturing economy to a retail,
Technological developments
service, and white-collar economy.
enabled firms to replace many workers with machines, and globalization
caused companies to outsource millions of jobs to low wage countries
like China and India. By 1990, only 16.1% of workers were union
members, and today only 12.3% of employees are union members-a
mere 7.2% of private sector workers.
As union membership has declined, shareholder and managerial
wealth has expanded while worker wealth has stagnated. Although a
reasonably exercised (due care), and compliance with other applicable requirements." Id.
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substantial percentage of private sector workers would like a collective
voice to advance their employment interests, most fear employer
reprisals if they openly support unions. NLRA remedies are weak,
enabling businesses to threaten or even discharge union supporters with
minimal economic costs.
If the NLRA is to adapt to twenty-first century circumstances, the
definition of "employee" must be expanded to include white-collar
professionals who do not meaningfully direct the work of others,
technically independent contractors who, as a matter of economic
reality, are effectively "employees" of the firms for which they work,
and permatemps from employment services who work for prolonged
periods for single companies. Undocumented aliens who work for
businesses until they are discharged when they decide to support union
campaigns should be entitled to back pay until their unfair labor practice
cases are concluded.
NLRA procedures should be modified to expedite the union
selection process and make it easier for union supporters to counter antiunion arguments made by employers. When firms communicate their
anti-union messages, union supporters should have an equal opportunity
to reply. Union certifications should either be determined through
authorization card checks or through secret ballot elections conducted on
an expedited basis. Temporary restraining orders should be required to
immediately reinstate employees terminated because of their support for
unions.
When newly certified labor organizations are unable to achieve first
contracts, binding arbitration on a final-offer basis could be used to
determine the initial terms of employment for the unionized employees.
If Congress does not feel comfortable with binding arbitration, it could
use fact-finding with non-binding recommendations.
Unions have to develop new organizing approaches to appeal to
twenty-first century workers who consider themselves to be white-collar
professionals and who feel uncomfortable being members of
conventional unions. It would be beneficial for AFL-CIO and Change to
Win affiliates to create new professional associations that would appeal
to service, finance, insurance, health care, and technology personnel.
These entities must also promise to advance their professional interests,
and not simply their economic interests.
Even if unions are able to organize new age workers and expand
their membership rolls, most private sector employees will continue to
lack a collective voice. To extend industrial democracy to these
individuals, Congress should enact legislation mandating employee
involvement committees that would enable worker representatives to
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obtain information regarding company circumstances and to be
consulted before managers make decisions that would significantly
affect employee interests. Congress should also mandate the election of
employee representatives to corporate boards, and impose a dual
fiduciary obligation on all corporate board members and top company
officials that would protect the interests of both shareholders and
workers. The "business judgment rule" could be used to protect leaders
who make difficult decisions in good faith reasonably considering the
interests of both shareholders and employees.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol27/iss2/2

46

